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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERLA H. CARTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD W. CARTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14554 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a brief on the refusal of the Court to 
exercise its discretion and modify an existing Decree of 
Divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This item arose in Juab County, Utah. Prior to 
the divorce, the parties had accumulated considerable 
properties in Levan area of Juab County, Utah. In addition, 
the defendant and appellant was a construction worker and 
had tremendous income producing capacities. A Decree of 
Divorce was entered on,or about, the 12th of June, 1973, 
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which, among other things, awarded the plaintiff $200.00 per 
month alimony, the home of the parties in Hevan, Utah, con-
siderable farming property and other property in the Levan 
area. In the due course of events, a Petition to Modify 
the Decree of Divorce to reduce the alimony was filed before 
the above entitled court, the defendant and appellant alleging 
change of circumstances. Primarily the hearing on 14 January, 
1976, is the controlling item in this matter, and as a result 
thereof, the trial Judge refused to modify the Decree of 
Divorce. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The reversal of Judge Burns1 Order refusing to 
modify the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce and the alimony 
provisions therein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the divorce, defendant was an 
able-bodied man, and in addition to the property acciomulations 
that the trial Court disposed of at the time of the divorce, 
had a tremendous earning capacity of approximately $21,000.00. 
At the time of the hearing on the modification, defendant had 
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remarried, and his earning capacity was approximately one-half 
of the amount at the time of the divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO MODIFY SAID DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
There is no question this comes under the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, being provided for 
by Section 30-3-5 of same, allowing the trial Court to keep 
jurisdiction to make modifications wherever they might be 
proper. 
While there were considerable arguments and a great 
deal of court hearings back and forth about properties, 
violations of each others property rights awarded by the 
Court at the time of the divorce and items of this nature, 
these hearings were based primarily upon putting into effect 
the Court's Decree and differences in opinion as to how this 
should be done and whether the parties had correctly inter-
preted the Decree and taken the property. At the time of 
the divorce the plaintiff and respondent was awarded the 
home in Juab County, Utah, and, in the opinion of the under-
signed, a more than equitable share of the property that had 
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been accumulated there. At the time of the divorce in addition 
to the property items and items of this nature, the income of 
which was later denied to the appellant by giving the properties 
to the respondent, the appellant was also steadily employed in 
construction work and making $21,000.00 a year. (See transcript 
of 14 January, 1976, page 33, line 11) This is uncontested. 
In addition, at the time of the hearing for modification, the 
properties that had previously been awarded to the plaintiff 
were capable of producing in excess of $2,000.00 a month 
properly operated. (See transcript of 14 January, 1976, page 
32, line 21.) This is over and above the home and various 
other things that had been provided for the plaintiff. At 
the time of the hearing for modification, to-wit, 14 January, 
1976, the defendant and appellant was on unemployment, and 
the construction type work he had been doing was no longer 
available. He had been laid off by Utah International in 
Cedar City, Utah. However, he had made the mistake of 
remarrying a girl that in Cedar City, Utah was locally 
termed as an heiress. There had been hearings on other 
items pertaining to the estate from which the defendant's 
present wife was to inherit from that colored the Judge's 
thinking in this particular matter. The same Judge having 
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set in Iron County on the estate items and now setting in 
Juab County on the divorce and modification item. In 
addition to remarrying and taking on other obligations, the 
primary purpose for the modification was the reduction in 
income. Although drawing unemployment at the time of the 
hearing, thei defendant at that time was employed by Utah 
International at the Cedar City Iron Mines, and his 
anticipation of employment was between ten and twelve 
thousand dollars per year when fully employed, without 
consideration of the layoffs. (See transcript of 14 
January, 1976, page 33, line 27) It was the appellant1s 
thinking that under these conditions his income had been 
reduced to better than half and he asked for modification 
of the Decree of Divorce and the alimony provisions therein 
hy half. This was refused by the trial Court. 
There is no question this was an abuse of 
discretion. The only reason that can possibly be 
attributed to the failure of this nature to consider, 
bearing in mind that the divorce decree itself had made a 
wealthy woman out of the plaintiff, provided her with 
considerable income property in addition to the home and 
items of this nature, and in addition to this the plain-
tiff was producing income frorri work in the Juab County area, 
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the only consideration that can be given is the trial Court 
erred in failing to consider these items. This is especially 
true when one considers that the trial Court admittedly 
considered items not presented in evidence. In this particular 
case, the defendant having testified at thd time of the hearing 
on modification that he was under a doctor's supervision and 
that many types of construction equipment he could no longer 
ride. He was limited to welding and repaid work and things 
of this nature. (See transcript 14 Januar^, 1976, page 34, 
line 6 to page 35, line 24) Although the back injury was 
ancient, it had not been bothering him at the time of the 
divorce, but at the time of the hearing of the modification 
was active and work was limited pursuant to doctor's orders. 
Under these conditions, there can be no question 
that the trial Court failed to give consideration to the 
testimony as it was presented, and there is no question 
that there was a substantial change in conditions. At any 
time any person has their income reduced from $21,000.00 a 
year to ten to twelve thousand dollars a year, takes on 
additional obligations, has health problems) that limit the 
type of work they can do, there is a substantial change in 
conditions. Also, it is common knowledge that if anyone 
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rides construction equipment long enough, they are going to 
have back troubles that will impair them the later portion of 
their life and impair their incapacities. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
TO THE TRIAL COURT IN ANOTHER HEARING AND NOT 
PRESENTED IN THIS HEARING. 
It has always been the understanding of the under-
signed in very limited and severely curtailed law practice in 
the State of Utah that juries and courts were limited to con-
sidering as evidence only the things presented. The under-
signed has some faint memory of having heard the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns, who was judge on this item, instruct juries to 
the effect that they consider nothing not presented in the 
courtroom. There had been considerable proceedings in Iron 
County, Utah, before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns prior to 
the hearing for modification of Decree of Divorce in the 
matter of the estate of George W. Hunter, deceased, pertaining 
to cattle operations and items of this nature, where the 
defendant, Gerald W. Carter, had testified as to possible 
operations for cattle, lease operations that he might be 
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interested in and items of this nature. The present Mrs. 
Carter, one of the heirs in that estate, had a local 
reputation of having received considerable property thereby. 
In the opinion of the undersigned, the present plaintiff, 
Verla H. Carter, together with her present attorney, Dave 
McMullin, considered bringing an alienation of affections 
suit against the present Mrs. Gerald W. Carter, and in one 
instance the undersigned was so advised by Dave McMullin. 
It stands to reason that there was considerable local 
gossip about the defendant in the instant case marrying 
an heiress, both in Iron County and Juab County. 
There is no question that in refusing to modify 
the Decree of Divorce, the trial Court considered evidence 
from outside the courtroom, and very honestly immediately 
made a disclosure to both counsel of same. See transcript 
14 January, 1976, page 50, line 9 to line 22, which is as 
follows: 
MTHE COURT: Mr Fenton, Mr. McMullin, before 
you go further and since it is part of the Court's 
ruling in this matter and counsel for each of 
the parties are entitled to know the basis of 
the Court's ruling, in addition to the testimony 
heretofore heard in this matter and heard today 
in this matter the Court is not unmindful of the 
testimony of this defendant that he was capable 
physically and qualified to run cattle and lease 
property and operate a ranch operation in the 
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other matter the Court referred to pending 
in Iron County, Frankly, this Court, and I 
would assume any other court cannot divorce 
entirely testimony heard in other matters 
bearing directly upon the same type issues 
and you are entitled to that being in the 
record and the record so reflects." 
CONCLUSION 
This item should be remanded back to the trial 
Court with orders to grant the Petition for Modification and 
cut the alimony in two, pursuant to the original Petition 
for Modification. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
